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CULTURALISM – FROM IDEA TO UNCONSCIOUS 
PRESUPPOSITION  
Kulturalizam – od ideje do nesvesne pretpostavke 
ABSTRACT  The  authors  argue  that  the  ideas  found  in  the  harder  versions  of 
multiculturalism  have  already  been  supported  by  the  mid-20
th  century  social-cultural 
anthropology – both in the scholarly works and in the political activism of its proponents. 
This form of cultural relativism, making the leap from anthropological method to ontological 
claims about the organic essence of cultures, is hereby named “culturalism”. By this notion 
the authors understand a theory of culture that includes central anthropological ideas: a 
culture precedes and determines individuals belonging to it; cultures have unlimited freedom 
to generate differences, uninhibited by any human nature; cultures form closed, organic 
units  where  all  their  different  articulations,  from  gastronomy  to  theology,  form  an 
unbreakable whole which implies that these value systems are unique and in no way may be 
compared with, or judged against, other value systems. Cultural relativism formulated in the 
American anthropology of the 1940’s and onwards is far from being a simple doctrine. It 
consists of a whole cluster of loosely connected facts, axioms, propositions, ranging from the 
completely unproblematic, to strongly problematic and even hardly understandable ideas. 
All those statements have been critically scrutinized in this paper. 
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APSTRAKT U ovom tekstu se brani teza da su ideje koje se javljaju u “tvrđim” verzijama 
multikulturalizma  već  bile  zastupljene  u  sociokulturnoj  antropologiji  sredinom  20.  veka, 
kako  u  naučnim  radovima,  tako  i  u  političkom  aktivizmu  njegovih  pristalica.  Taj  vid 
kulturnog relativizma, u kome se pravi skok od antropološkog metoda do ontoloških stavova 
o  organskoj  suštini  kulturâ,  naziva  se  ovde  “kulturalizmom”.  Pod  tim  pojmom  autori 
podrazumevaju teoriju kulture koja obuhvata nekoliko ključnih antropoloških ideja: kultura 
prethodi  pojedincima koji  joj  pripadaju  i bitno  ih  određuje; kulture imaju  neograničenu 
slobodu da prave razlike i u tome ih ne sprečava ljudska priroda; kulture čine zatvorene, 
organske celine, gde sva njihova različita ispoljavanja, od gastronomije do teologije, čine 
neraskidivu celinu tako da su ovi vrednosni sistemi jedinstveni i ni na koji način se ne mogu 
porediti, ili  procenjivati,  pomoću  drugih  vrednosnih  sistema.  Kulturni  relativizam koji je 
———— 
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formulisala američka antropologija počev od četrdesetih godina 20. veka pa nadalje nije 
jednostavno učenje: on se sastoji od niza labavo povezanih činjenica, aksioma i postavki, 
koje se kreću od sasvim neproblemtičnih do vrlo problematičnih, čak teško razumljivih. U 
ovom radu su svi ti stavovi podvrgnuti kritičkom preispitivanju. 
KLJUČNE REČI kulturalizam, kulturni relativizam, američka antropologija 
Introduction: Origins of Culturalism 
Many of the ideas we find in the harder versions of multiculturalism already 
lie  preformed  in  mid-20
th  century  anthropology  –  both  in  central  and  popular 
writings  and  in  political  activism.  This  cultural  relativism,  taking  the  leap  from 
anthropological method to ontological claims about the organic essence of cultures, 
can be named “culturalism”. By this notion we understand a theory of culture which 
assumes the central anthropological ideas: that culture precedes and determines the 
individuals  belonging  to  it;  that  cultures  have  unlimited  freedom  to  generate 
differences, uninhibited by any human nature; and that cultures form closed, organic 
units where all their different articulations, from gastronomy to theology, form an 
unbreakable whole which implies that these value systems are unique and in no way 
may be compared  with  or judged against  other  value systems. It  is important to 
realize  that  this  culturalism  is  very  closely  related  to  nationalism,  which  it  has 
among its ancestors three generations earlier in its ancestral tree in the history of 
ideas – Franz Boas, basing his anthropology on Herder’s romantic concept of the 
nation. 
Boas  himself  did  not,  however,  take  the  full  step  from  cultural  relativist 
method to culturalism – this step  was made particularly in the  generation  of  his 
disciples. Culturalism is, so to speak, nationalism transferred from state to society. 
The whole idea of combining an organic concept of culture with regimentation of 
individuals which so strongly incited 19
th century nationalisms and made them fight 
for the formation of new states, the articulation of national cultures and expulsion of 
minorities – this whole complex was now, remarkably unchanged, applied to the 
largely stateless peoples that anthropologists studied. While 19
th century nationalism 
had been allied with liberalism and had a status as an emancipation ideology turned 
against absolute monarchy, nobility and old, multinational empires, nationalism had, 
during the 20
th century, matured into a primarily right wing ideology, turned against 
the international character of liberalism as well as socialism. 
It  is  a  strange  fact  that  in  the  mid-20
th  century,  when  nationalism  was 
supplemented by culturalism built on the very same cluster of cultural concepts and 
the  same  tradition  in  the  history  of  ideas,  this  culturalism  primarily  (but  not 
exclusively)  found  its  place  on  the  political  left,  just  as  nationalism  had  done  a 
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defending its “cultures” against the then still prevailing Western colonial empires 
with national bases. 
Thus,  from  around  the  middle  of  the  20
th  century  we  bear  witness  to  the 
strange constellation  of a right  wing culturalism in the shape  of  nationalism and 
fascism – and a left wing culturalism referring to stateless peoples, minorities and 
former colonies. The only difference is that the former talks about cultures, nations, 
and states, while the latter talks about cultures, peoples, and communities – but the 
underlying culturalist and anti-individualist cluster of concepts in the two is exactly 
the same. And their political idea of the comprehensive rights of the community vis-
à-vis the individual is equally tough. This relatedness was hardly evident to anybody 
in  1948  –  even  if  it  is  striking  how  hard  a  time  Herskovits  had  been  trying  to 
articulate a cultural relativist position which must not, logically, lead to a tolerant 
acceptance of nationalist socialism – Nazism. But the reason why it was not obvious 
by then was of course due to the fact that most of the political left wing in the West 
was  by  then  internationalist,  whether  in  the  social  democrat,  New  Deal  or 
communist variants. But with the seeds of culturalism sown, a culturalist germ was 
growing on the left which would become strong once the left eventually relativized 
or even totally gave up its commitment to internationalism and universalism. The 
result was multiculturalism. 
Yet, the culturalism of Benedict (1959) and Herskovits (1958) lack the prefix 
“multi”  –  and  this  of  course  was  because  they,  just  like  nationalists, 
unproblematically assumed a bond between people and territory. Anthropological 
cultures generally occupied each their own territorial site – and when they did not, 
the reason was Western imperialism which broke up natural habitats and destroyed 
the clay cups of Chief Ramon. To become “multi”, culturalism now needed just a 
small amendment: that more than one of these broken cups should be present at one 
and the same place and compete for one and the same political power. 
Even if cultural relativism thus had a strong institutional position, also in the 
public  perception  of  anthropology,  a  tension  has  remained  within  anthropology 
throughout this period. It always contained many different currents, and the debate 
on cultural relativism surfaced decade after decade, for example, on the pages of 
American Anthropologist. It is curious to trace the anthropological discussion about 
culturalism during the second half of the 20
th century. What, in the generation of 
Benedict  and  Herskovits,  had  been  avant-garde,  had  been  the  insight  of  a  few 
pioneers struggling to found a novel and all-encompassing Science of Man which 
had faced ethnocentrism in science and imperialism outside it – all this had given 
way to a quite different picture. During the 1960s, cultural relativism had become 
popular, supported by the fancy for exotics of the ‘68 generation and its cult  of 
“primitive” and “authentic” forms of life. 362  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LII (2010), N° 4 
At the same time, anthropological relativism had, to a large extent, proved 
academically  victorious and  even received support from  other  disciplines.  In the 
theory of science, the prevailing interpretation of Thomas Kuhn’s idea of science as 
based on different and mutually exclusive “paradigms” was that the paradigm was 
holistic  and  that  it  thoroughly  determined  the  single  scientific  facts;  just  like  a 
Benedictian culture determines its individuals. Gradually, as anthropology studied 
the dwindling number of remaining “primitive” societies, interest grew in studying 
the  different  classes,  layers,  and  subcultures  of  western  culture,  and  the  new 
discipline  of  Cultural  Studies  appeared,  based  for  example  at  the  Birmingham 
School of Cultural Studies in the UK. Subcultures, such as working class culture, 
youth culture, and immigrant cultures were studied –with the assumption of the idea 
of subcultures as “a whole way of life” large parts of Cultural Studies developed a 
holist  concept  of  cultures  of  a  structure  similar  to  Benedict’s.  With  postmodern 
relativism and the growing social constructivism of the 1980s, it might almost seem 
as though anthropology was losing the race to its own relativist offspring in other 
disciplines. In anthropology, a more universalist pocket of resistance – around the 
leading  mid-century  anthropologist,  Claude  Lévi-Strauss  –  had  never  been 
eliminated, and other currents, skeptical against the radical relativity of culture also 
occurred during the 80s, such as the growing interest in human biology and human 
universals on the one hand and research on the human mind in the cognitive sciences 
and neurosciences on the other hand. 
This  scenario  forms  the  background  for  yet  another  round  in  the 
anthropological debate over relativism, initiated by a paper of the most influential 
anthropologist towards the end of the 20
th century, Clifford Geertz. Geertz’s idea of 
an  “interpretative”  anthropology  takes  field  studies  further,  but  now  with  the 
addition of a semiotic relativism. Descriptions are always already interpretations, 
dependent upon the language and the semiotic devices they employ – this forms a 
second-order relativism in the very description, which is laid on top of Benedictian 
relativism in the anthropological object. This gives a relativism whose radicality by 
far surpasses that of Boas, Benedict, and Herskovits: now science is but a specific 
cultural institution in a specific culture – Western culture – and it has no further 
claims to truth than magic, witchcraft, shamanism, and similar institutions in other 
cultures. 
From the background of this linguistic relativism it is logical that Geertz’s 
attack on anti-relativism must assume the shape of a rhetorical feast. His relativist 
program paper “Anti-anti Relativism” (Geertz, 1984) is, as indicated by the title, no 
direct defense of relativism, but rather, based on the idea that an attack is the best 
defense; it forms a howling assault against what he sees as a growing anti-relativism. 
The paper and the debate around it is the history of the 1940’s, now repeated as a 
farce. Geertz assumes that anthropological cultural relativism has prevailed once and 
for all – but now  he sees  old arch-enemies such as rationalism (in the shape  of Jens-Martin Eriksen, Frederik Stjernfelt: Culturalism...  363 
cognitive science) and naturalism (in the shape of human biology) creeping back on 
stage. His attack is a joyful affair – the two enemies are dressed up as absolutist 
straw men with scare quotes and capitals: they believe in “The Human Mind” and 
“Human Nature” as unitary, dictatorial  idols, and these  ghosts are drowned  in a 
tornado of glittering metaphors – at the same time as Geertz, without further details, 
claims that it is incorrect he should be understood as meaning everything has equal 
value. 
It is striking to record the difference as compared to the serious and hard-
fought discussions among the anthropologists in the 1940’s – a different academic 
culture had developed, and ridicule of the opponent (so much for tolerance!) has 
acquired a far more central position than the attempt to give a coherent description 
of one’s own position. Geertz’s position is described in the negative only – on the 
one  hand  he spends  most  of the paper  laughing at the  new dangerous absolutes 
Human Mind and Human Nature – on the other hand he goes against the attacks on 
cultural relativism by defining himself in purely negative terms: ”... I, no nihilist, no 
subjectivist, and possessed, as you can see, of some strong views as to what is real 
and what is not, what is commendable and what is not, what is reasonable and what 
is not ...” (Geertz, 1984: 275) 
In contrast to the old, doctrinaire - but also struggling and admirably honest –
cultural relativism  of  Benedict and Herskovits,  we  now see a  victorious cultural 
relativism which no longer has any need to make explicit and defend its position, but 
takes it to be sufficient to ridicule its opponents. The victories of anthropology are 
consequently also conceived of in the past tense: “... anthropology has played, in our 
day, a vanguard role. We have been the first to insist on a number of things: that the 
world does not divide into the pious and the superstitious; that there are sculptures in 
jungles and paintings in deserts; that political order is possible without centralized 
power and principled justice without codified rules; that the norms of reason were 
not fixed in Greece, the evolution of morality not consummated in England” (ibid.) 
Real  and  dubious  results  are  mixed  up  in  this  anthropological  self-
congratulation  with  ease,  but  the  relativist  credo  remains  unchanged:  “Most 
important, we were the first to insist that we see the lives of others through lenses of 
our own grinding and that they look back on ours through ones of their own” (ibid.). 
The only proper argument present in the paper is worthy of being exposed: “The 
supposed conflict between Benedict’s and Herskovits’s call for tolerance and the 
untolerant  passion  with  which  they  called  for  it  turns  out  not  to  be  the  simple 
contradiction so many amateur logicians have held it to be, but the expression of a 
perception, caused by thinking a lot about Zunis and Dahomeys, that, the  world 
being so full of a number of things, rushing to judgment is more than a mistake, it’s 
a crime” (Geertz, 1984: 265). But Steward’s and Barnett’s arguments against the 
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very doctrine was ripe with contradictions. The same thing goes for Geertz’s claim. 
How can a “perception” result from thinking much about Zunis and Dahomeys? The 
results of the trains of thought of Benedict and Herskovits was a series of claims, 
propositions, judgments, rather than perceptions. But the reason why Geertz cannot 
say this is that to him the very “rushing to judgment” is already a crime – to claim 
something  about  the  world  is  a  criminal  act,  because  the  world  is  full  of  many 
things! It is remarkable that a scientist, even seen as leading in his field, may assert 
such a thing: that because there are many things in the world, it is a crime to make a 
judgment about it. So sloppy a condemnation of opponents is only possible in a 
person who feels very secure in his case: a victor proudly listing his strong allies in 
the  war:  ”the  appearance  of  deconstructionist  literary  criticism,  the  spread  of 
nonfoundationalist  moods  in  metaphysics  and  epistemology,  and  the  rejection  of 
whiggery and method-ism in the history of science” (Geertz, 1984: 257). 
It is evident from the text that against such an alliance the study of human 
cognition and nature stands no chance. So even if these opponents are dressed up as 
dangerous  fools  –  this  has  to  be  done  in  order  to  get  the  metaphorical  carnival 
running – the text leaves no doubt that they do not constitute any real danger and are 
only  pathological  cases  of  “hyper-logicism”  and  “hyper-adaptationism”.  And 
Geertz’s own position is so evident that there is no reason to present, explain, or 
defend it. 
In came, however, just as in the previous rounds, objections against Geertz’s 
anti-anti-relativism. Nissim-Sabat (1987) criticized details in both Herskovits’ and 
Geertz’s  field  studies  which  he  finds  are  systematically  blind  to  decisive  facts, 
exactly because of their programmatic relativism. Herskovits describes at length the 
general  polygamy  of  the  Dahomeys  without  wondering  for  a  second  where  this 
enormous surplus of women actually came from. It came from warfare, slave trade, 
and  the  killing  of  male  slaves  –  things  Herskovits  is  too  well-mannered  to 
investigate, Nissim-Sabat claims. In Geertz, he points to the fact that women do not 
appear at all in his famous Moroccan field study on Islam: here, Geertz blindly takes 
over the invisibility of women in Moroccan Islam to the extent that he does not 
register it and even reproduces it in his own presentation! Nissim-Sabat thus claims 
that cultural relativism is not only politically problematic, but it may also lead to a 
systematic  blindness  in  science:  if  a  certain  culture  is  constructed  around 
overlooking or making invisible certain aspects of its own foundation, then it is easy 
for the cultural relativist field worker to be so much “participant observer” that he 
also keeps tacit about them, maybe even does not discover at all the embarrassing 
facts which the culture in question remains silent about. 
The principal problem behind such errors is, according to Nissim-Sabat, the 
cultural  determinism  of  relativism  which  he  compares  to  Geertz’s  criticism  of 
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better than biological determinism? The assumption that culture has the ability to 
completely determine the individual appears again, forty years later, as the decisive 
problem in culturalism. It entails that any culture demands respect, only because it 
functions – that is, no matter what price this functioning has for the individuals: 
”What  most  people  learn  from  Benedict  is  that  every  culture  deserves  respect 
because it works” (Nissim-Sabat 1987: 938). 
In a certain sense, the same arguments re-circulate  in the 1980s as in the 
1940s. But the whole scenery around the argument has changed. The picture of the 
few,  truth-seeking  anthropologists  against  a  vast  scientific  and  political  power 
structure has given way to victorious anthropologists who may enlist a whole army 
of allies in scientific neighbor disciplines and who do not need to use arguments 
against rationalists and naturalists but may let fun and ridicule do the work. The 
price of this victory is coolly summarized in Washburn’s looking back on the fight 
of the 1940s in 1987 (Washburn, 1987): it is the very idea of anthropology as a 
science – “The Science of Man”, “The Scientific Theory of Culture” – which was so 
highly prized by the first generations of American anthropologists, but which is now 
eroded. 
Geertz gradually came to think that anthropology itself was merely a form of 
“writing” which said more about the writer and his own culture than it said about the 
culture portrayed.  As a logical consequence  of his radicalization  of relativism to 
epistemological relativism, one is not only unable to judge about matters in other 
cultures, one is now also unable to describe them at all, because one is inevitably 
caught up in the language of one’s own culture. Relativism thus, in reality, devoured 
the  very  scientific  ambitions  of  anthropology  –  while  the  critical  ambitions 
remained, and even in a certain sense grew. This is why the anthropologist may feel 
certain nostalgia: “Anthropologists may long for the good old days when one could 
easily identify with the good guys (natives), struggling for freedom against the bad 
guys  (the  West),  preventing  their  emergence  as  independent  and  self-regulating 
states. It was the attitude that underlay the AAA Executive Board’s Statement on 
Human Rights in 1947
*. But in the intervening 40 years, the simple picture of the 
post-war  period  has  dissolved  into  the  complex  picture  of  1987.  It  has  become 
impossible to apply the Executive Board’s policy recommendations of 1947 to the 
specific situations of today” (Washburn, 1987: 942). 
To Washburn, the critical ambitions from the 1947 manifesto were now past – 
but  to  other  anthropologists,  criticism  was  rather  what  remained,  now  the 
scientifically ambitions must wither away. The strange thing in this development is 
———— 
*  Ovde  se  misli  na  protest  koji  je  Izvršni  odbor  Američkog  udruženja  antropologa  (American 
Association of Anthropologists - AAA), na čelu sa Melvilom Herskovicem, uputio UN povodom nacrta 
Povelje o ljudskim pravima. To saopštenje je objavljeno u časopisu American Anthropologist (AAA 
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that, in the meantime, large parts of middle class public, academia and the political 
left wing had taken over the same cultural relativist ideas of criticism. Boas and 
Benedict had taken the step from cultural relativism as research method and to a 
normative doctrine – but they had been unambiguous as to the possibility as well as 
the necessity of objective empirical field study. In the spread of cultural relativism 
as versunkenes Kulturgut which had taken place in large parts of the Western middle 
class towards the end of the century, it was often only culturalism as a normative, 
critical  doctrine  that  remained.  Now  that  doctrine  could  almost  be  used  as  an 
argument for not being interested in other cultures – if we have decided beforehand 
that they have equal value and dignity, and if we are imprisoned in our own culture 
and language all the same, then there is no reason to take any interest in them, and 
there is no reason to believe in or investigate claims about barbaric customs and 
suppression  in  other  cultures,  for  we  have  always  already  decided  that  they  are 
respectable.
3 
No professional anthropologist would ever support such a claim, of course. 
But in a strange twist, it seems to have become the public result of the fact that of 
the original cultural relativism, only the worst part survived in the popular version of 
the  middle-class  audience:  the  automatic  tolerance  towards  anything  alien,  just 
because it is alien. And, correlatively, the automatic criticism of every part of one’s 
own culture and the home of cultural relativism itself: America, and Western culture 
more broadly. 
This boiled-down culturalism dominated the mindset in large parts of Western 
academia and the middle-class in the 1990’s when growing immigration put a new 
type of culturalism on the agenda: multiculturalism.  
The argument of Culturalism Dissected 
Before  we  proceed  to  multiculturalism,  let  us  analyze  the  details  of  the 
culturalist argument. 
The philosopher P.F. Schmidt presented as early as 1955, in his paper “Some 
Criticisms of Cultural Relativism” (Schmidt, 1955), a clear and detailed charting of 
central steps and problems in the culturalist complex of arguments. He distinguishes 
three  different  claims:  a  fact,  a  hypothesis  and  an  ethical  doctrine.  The 
anthropological argument takes its point of  departure in a cultural relativist fact 
which can be rephrased as follows: 
 
———— 
3 Cf. the idea, which for a period spread in parts of anthropology, that cannibalism had never existed 
and was only an ideological anthropological construction, both among neighboring tribes to the alleged 
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1)  Different cultural systems of value and thought exist. 
 
This premise is empirically indubitable – and furnishes the reality base on 
which Benedict & Co. may claim that cultural relativism forms a scientific theory. 
But from this, the normative relativism in no way follows – the norm which Schmidt 
calls the cultural relativist thesis: 
 
2)  There  is  no  cross-cultural  norm  which  may  judge  between  the  different 
standards of different cultures. 
 
This is a meta-ethical hypothesis which is in no way entailed by (1). It might 
for instance be the case that cultures are different, but that there still exists a set of 
true values or true claims on which different cultures may be judged – maybe a set 
of truths we have not yet investigated thoroughly. In the same way as there exist 
many different claims and propositions, true and false, about any certain states-of-
affairs which may only subsist in one way. That cannot be the case if (2) holds. But 
(2) is not incompatible with what could be called empirical universalism either: that 
the meticulous investigation of the cultures of the world might, someday, result in 
the fact that all of them share certain values or thoughts, even if (2) claims that no 
meta-theory may exist which may confirm that these common values or thoughts are 
in some sense correct. But no matter whether the meta-ethical claim of (2) is in fact 
correct or not, it is surprising that cultural relativism very often hastens on to the 
normative claim that “Tolerance is good” – the cultural relative norm:  
 
3)  Therefore all cultures have a right to tolerance 
 
which, as Schmidt asserts, in no way follows from (1) and (2). In a certain sense, (3) 
is  even  in  flagrant  contradiction  to  (2).  Whilst  (2)  claims  that  there  can  be  no 
normative cross-cultural demands which are valid, (3) quickly erects exactly such a 
demand: tolerance. Quite to the contrary, a more probable result of claim (2) would 
be  the  never  ending  battle  between  cultures:  strife  or  outright  warfare  between 
ethnocentric  values,  exactly  because  no  cross-cultural  doctrine  is  possible  which 
might  settle  the  dispute  and  end  the  strife.  As  Renteln  says:  ”If  relativism  is 
associated with any value, it is ethnocentrism and not tolerance” (Renteln 1988: 63). 
We can add that it may be for that reason that (3) is seen as necessary, that is, 
exactly because (3) does not follow from (2). (3) is taken as a necessary remedy to 
stop  the  strife  which  (2)  makes  inevitable.  But  for  many  cultural  relativists,  (3) 
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against  various  colonized  populations  which  early  anthropology  praiseworthily 
turned against. Maybe the urgent character of this appeal has blurred the principal 
problem for the relativists – cf. Herskovits above who seems to mean that cultures 
outside  the  detrimental  sphere  of  influence  of  the  west  have  by  and  large  lived 
tolerantly in peace with each other. If you take this rosy idea as a point of departure, 
you miss the point that (3) maintained with equal force for all cultures potentially 
leads to tolerance towards intolerances of all sorts. 
There are, however, more aspects of the cultural relativist doctrine than those 
three basic ideas listed by Schmidt.
4 As a consequence  of (1),  we can place the 
methodological idea that 
 
4)  If you investigate an alien culture, it must take place in a neutral way, so that 
the anthropologist strives to place his own cultural assumptions in brackets.  
 
As we have seen, (4) may motivate ethnographical (field work as participant 
observer)  and  ethnological  (comparative  cross-cultural  studies)  rules  of  conduct 
which have shown scientific validity. (4), however, entails a restriction on (2): the 
anthropologist is assumed to be able to be or bring himself a suitable distance from 
his  own  culture  so  that  he  does  not  simply  reproduce  cultural  prejudices  in  his 
research. It is thus presupposed to be possible that the anthropologist may, at one 
and  the  same  time,  participate  in  the  culture  studied  and  maintain  an  objective 
distance to  what he sees and participates in. But already before the  next step to 
maintain  the  difference  between  cultures,  there  are  important  problems  in  the 
principle (4). How do you warrant that the anthropologist does not blindly reproduce 
the  culture’s  own  biased  understandings  of  itself  and  does  not  systematically 
overlook important issues which the culture studied is, in itself, organized in a way 
not to discover? 
Another important addition to (1) says that not only that different systems of 
value and thought exist, but: 
 
5)  Systems of value of thought are infinitely variable.  
 
It is not entailed by the naked fact of (1) and is, as a matter of fact, a daring 
generalization – how could we know that? It is presented as an explicit claim in 
Benedict, but also implies certain dangers in the work of the anthropologist: he may 
easily overlook resemblances between cultures, if from the very beginning he only 
intends  to  find  differences.  The  specificity  of  cultures  may  be  exaggerated  in 
———— 
4 Renteln (1988) investigates in more depth some of the aspects of relativism. Jens-Martin Eriksen, Frederik Stjernfelt: Culturalism...  369 
description, and cross-cultural loans, communication, hybridization and influence 
between  cultures  may  become  invisible,  just  like  cultural,  biological,  or  other 
universals may be. But (5) is also problematic for another reason: is it really correct 
that cultural variability is infinite? Could any possible bundle of cultural features, 
practices, ideas, and values be put together and be made to function as a culture? 
Could there exist a culture which celebrated murder as the highest value, or a culture 
which saw any kind of appetite as a vice? Could there exist a culture which claimed 
that all things fall upwards? As Barry Smith says: could there exist a culture where 
the acceptance of any agreement required that the two parties subjected themselves 
to painful surgery or proved a hitherto unproved mathematical conjecture? There 
are, in fact, two distinct problems here: could there exist a culture with consequently 
counterproductive  value  systems?  And  could  there  exist  a  culture  with 
systematically erroneous systems of facts? 
As  a  further  important  point  about  (1)  is  that  we  can  thus  see  it  has  two 
variants: 
 
6)  There are different cultural value systems 
 
7)  There are different cultural thought systems 
   
Naturally, they are just as unproblematically true as (1), but they do not have 
the same radicalism if they are taken as a basis for relativism. If we take cultural 
difference as an indication that there is no system which is more correct than another 
(2), then (6) gives rise to moral relativism, while (7), even more radically, gives rise 
to  epistemological  relativism  (as  we  encountered  in  Geertz).  Epistemological 
relativism,  resulting  from  (2)  plus  (7)  had  already  developed  in  early  American 
anthropology  in  the  shape  of  the  Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis,  presented  by  the  two 
anthropological linguists, the Boas disciple Edward Sapir and his disciple Benjamin 
Lee Whorf whose main idea can be expressed as follows: 
 
8)  Linguistic distinctions determine the distinctions of thought 
 
The  categories  employed  by  a  given  language  are  assumed  to  shape  the 
thought of the individual speaking the language, so that he cannot, in fact, think 
counter to his language. This idea, of course, can be found in more and less radical 
variants.  If  (8)  just  means  that  the  distinctions  of  language  –  along  with  other 
determinations - influence thought, then the claim seems unproblematic. But if it 
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what can be thought by an individual speaking that language, then it is far more 
problematic. (8) appears in further sub-variants, such as: 
 
9)  The lexical distinctions of language determine thought 
 
10)  The grammar of language determines thought 
 
The former claim refers to the observations such as different languages have 
different color taxonomies with greater or lesser degrees of granularity and different 
borderlines between color concepts – while the latter refers to the fact that different 
languages have different grammatical structuring of the same domain, e.g. as to the 
tempus forms of verbs. Here, a variant of (2) may play a role to the extent that it has 
been imagined that language is the only thing determining thought, so that color and 
time,  respectively,  should  in  themselves  be  undifferentiated  continua  which  are 
arbitrarily  cut  up  by  means  of  language  (a  basic  idea  in  American  as  well  as 
European structuralism). Berlin and Kay (1969) have disproved the radical version 
of (9) with an empirical investigation of color terms in many languages.
5 (10) taken 
along with (2) is more radical than (9) coupled with (2), because (10) is then taken to 
imply that thought categories which are not explicitly present in grammar cannot be 
used by a speaker of that language. 
Such an idea gave rise to some of Whorf’s more airy ideas such as the claim 
that the Navajos did  not have any  grammatical future  category and  hence  had a 
completely different time conception from us – ideas which have been, to a large 
extent, disproved, not least because languages have a manifold of alternative ways 
of expressing things which they do not have grammatical categories for (English 
does  not  have  a  grammatical  futurum  either  but  gets  along  with  an  auxiliary 
construction with “will” and “shall” – but hardly anyone will claim that English 
speakers live in the present now only and have no ideas about the future). The Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis has, however, had a huge effect, and it can still be encountered 
today, often accompanied by the “linguistic turn” in philosophy. The idea has thus 
given rise to popular but incorrect cultural relativist imaginings such as that about 
the manifold Eskimo concepts of snow and the like – a variant of (9). If “language” 
———— 
5 Berlin and Kay (1969) showed that across languages and cultures a ranking exists of the centrality of 
color categories (so that a language with only two color terms always has “white” and “black”, with 
three terms always “white”, “black”, and “red”, etc.) as well as a cross-cultural agreement of the place 
of focal colors in the color spectrum (pure white, pure black, pure red, etc. ...). This does not preclude, 
of course, that cognitive effects of linguistic categorization can be found. Thus, it has recently been 
shown that the Russian distinction between light blue and dark blue as two autonomous color terms 
makes  this  categorization  more  cognitively  efficient  than  the  languages  which  categorizes  this 
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in  the  generalization  often  promoted  by  “the  linguistic  turn”  thus  may  mean 
“cultural systems of value and thought in general”, then the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
becomes easy to reconcile with (2) with the idea that culture, as a whole, is learned 
like a language and is as systematic and coherent as a language. (8) - (10) are often 
conceived, either separately or together, as equivalent to the idea that a language 
comes with a world view. This idea is highly problematic, if only for the simple 
reason that it is well known that several and even antagonistic world views may be 
articulated and struggle within one and the same language (and, a fortiori, culture). 
This idea leads to the widespread assumption that cultures as such imply a world 
view or an ideology which is shared by all its members. 
This leads us to a further assumption in classic cultural relativism which was 
explicit in Benedict and adds to (1): 
 
11)  Cultures are holistic, organic entities, in which the meaning of each single 
feature can only be understood from the whole.  
 
This follows in no way from (1) – there might easily exist different cultural 
systems of value and thought without forming closed, organic wholes of type (11). 
The idea is presumably influenced by the fact that most of the cultures studied by 
early  anthropology  were  geographically  well-defined  on  small  and  separate 
territories, just as the cultures studied were most often rather small so that they were 
rarely segregated into highly visible, different, and competing subgroups. But (11) 
constitutes in fact, a highly problematic addition to (1), because (11) systematically 
overlooks a long series of important features in cultures. They are dynamic; they 
interact with other cultures; they form hybrid cultures; they often display internal 
oppositions between different subgroups, and many of the ideas of a culture may be 
weapons  of  one  subgroup’s  fight  against  another;  they  are  often  fuzzy  and 
contradictory and often have the character of a more or less loose sum of cultural 
parts  than  the  powerful  organic  metaphor  admits.  (11)  is  thus  a  very  important 
addition to (1) in order to get at the categorical articulation of meta-ethical relativism 
(2). 
If radical holism does not hold, it might be fairly difficult to compare cultures 
and  judge  them  to  be  different,  because  they  no  longer  form  separate  wholes, 
especially not in mixed societies. (11) as a hypothesis entails the danger that the 
anthropologist comes to  conceive  of a culture as  much  more static than  it is, to 
eternalize features which are only temporary, to exaggerate the unity of culture and 
overlook  plurality,  tensions,  contradictions,  and  social  oppositions  internally  in 372  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LII (2010), N° 4 
culture.
6 Politically, it immediately entails the danger that anthropology allies itself 
with the most traditionalist, most reactionary, even authoritarian forces which have 
an interest in keeping tradition “pure” and unchallenged, in enforcing the doctrines 
of culture and persuade or force ill-adjusted, deviant, or rebel members of the culture 
to submit. This is one of the most decisive premises of “hard” cultural relativism 
which is presented very explicitly in Benedict but which often lives a more secluded 
life as an undoubted but merely implicit premise. But how can cultures be assumed 
to  be  organic  wholes?  Only  if  they  possess  the  power  to  imprint  the  totality  of 
cultural  systems  in  all  individuals  in  a  successful  socialization  process  (cf. 
Herskovits on “enculturation”): 
 
12)  Cultures  determine  their  members,  and  the  cultural  systems  are  learned 
through socialization, often to a large extent without conscious access of the 
individuals. 
 
This claim is very often supplemented by the following: 
 
13)  When an  individual  is culturally  imprinted, he possesses as a capacity the 
decisive features of his culture, and they make him unable to see the world 
from the point of view of another culture and incapable (or only with great 
difficulty  and  bit  by  bit)  to  learn  the  value  and  thought  systems  of  other 
cultures. 
 
This determination hypothesis is often overlooked, but it constitutes a very 
important ingredient in the overall cultural relativist package, even, as Renteln puts 
it, the very core of cultural relativism.
7 Also this hypothesis has its blind spots. The 
anthropologist  may  have  a  hard  time  discovering  individuals  who  innovate  or 
develop their culture, individuals being inimical towards (aspects of) their culture, 
individuals who want to flee to be integrated into another culture. But the potentially 
political  implications  of  (13)  may  be  highly  problematic.  Just  as  racism  turned 
biology  into a  destiny, thus (12) and (13)  make  of  culture a destiny. It  is these 
———— 
6 Today, this error can be found in scholars who attribute to “Islam” very categorical features such that 
this  religion  is  assumed  to  be  incompatible  with  democracy  as  such  –  or  that  this  religion  is 
constitutively peaceful and hence incompatible with terrorism. Both supporters and opponents may thus 
find weapons in the “organic” concept of culture which implies the attractive economy of thought that 
complicated social structures with competing subgroups can be reduced to one organic entity to be 
supported or attacked. Both are, of course, equally problematic. 
7 In his defense of relativism, Herskovits (1958) underlines that its core is not the relativity of value 
systems, but the determinism of “enculturation” which not only refers to values but just as well to 
perception and thought – thus containing both ethical and epistemological relativism. Jens-Martin Eriksen, Frederik Stjernfelt: Culturalism...  373 
assumptions which make the individual into an apathetic, spineless product of his 
culture  which  he  may  never  escape.  Seen  from  this  point  of  view,  dissidents, 
deviants,  apostates,  converts,  nonbelievers,  culture  mixers  of  all  sorts  become 
problems because they do not satisfy the requirements of culture. In (12) and (13), 
the individual becomes, in fact, imprisoned in a specific world view and is placed 
beyond the reach  of argument. The anthropologist  may  not  only  easily  overlook 
figures like these,  if  he takes  his point  of  departure in (13),  he  may also  easily 
position himself on the same side as the most conservative forces in a culture, those 
who want to force, punish, even expel or exterminate such figures who do not in a 
suitable  way  conform  to  cultural  determination  and  “enculturation”.  (13) 
presupposes, in turn, a very decisive and problematic assumption which is far from 
always made explicit, namely: 
 
14)  Systems of value and thought originate exclusively in culture. 
 
This often lies as a premise in the interpretation of (1), cf. Herskovits’ note 
against human rights: “Standards and values are relative to the culture from which 
they derive” (AAA 1947: 542). But there might easily be a manifold of systems of 
value and thought (1), without culture being their sole source – it even seems fairly 
obvious that such systems actually do have a manifold of sources. The values and 
stocks of observations, knowledge, and hypotheses about the world have many more 
sources than the culture of those individuals: they may stem from innate tendencies, 
from  individual  observations,  experiences,  and  inferences,  from  cross-cultural 
economic,  social,  or  political  regularities,  from  a  priori  structures,  from  ideas 
borrowed from other cultures or other individuals.
8 (14) is the idea which makes the 
concept  of  culture  superior  to  all  other  levels  of  description  such  as  biological, 
sociological, economical, technological, for example, and which has allowed, to a 
large extent, the culturalist notion of culture to expand at the expense of those other 
descriptions in media and academia. 
Finally, there is the whole complex around relativism as a critical doctrine, 
such as maintained by (3). In reality, you could claim (1) and (2) along with the 
———— 
8 A priori: when people in most cultures believe that 2+2=4, it is probably not because it is a cultural 
heritage, but because 2+2=4. Biological: when human beings in all culture prefer food made up of 
proteins, carbohydrates and fats, rather than of sand, stones, or mud, it is because of universal features 
of  animal  biology. When  all  human  cultures  have  languages, this is based  on  specifically  human 
biological capacities not enjoyed by our closest kin, the great apes. When all known languages have 
demonstratives, it is not because of culture, but because of the need of pointing out the object you are 
talking about. Economical: when the scarcity of a good makes its value rise while the abundance of the 
same good may make its value fall, it is an economical regularity which does not form an inherited 
value of a culture. Sociological: when two-person groups are more stable than three-person groups, this 
has sociological reasons which do not stem from specific cultural evaluations. And so forth. 374  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LII (2010), N° 4 
whole cluster of  ideas from  (4) to (14)  without supporting tolerance at all. This 
would  give  a  picture  of  ethnocentric,  incommensurable  cultures,  unable  to 
communicate and probably mostly oriented towards mutual strife and warfare.
9 (3) is 
thus  not  added  as  a  logical  consequence  of  (2)  but,  quite  on  the  contrary,  as  a 
proposal for a means to avoid the consequences of (2). As already mentioned, this 
specifically anthropological concept of tolerance refers to cultures, not to persons. It 
is the culture as a whole which should be tolerated, not the individual whims of its 
members – particularly not if they do not fit into the cultural pattern tolerated. But 
what is more: it is far from always clear who is supposed to be the subject for (3): 
does it include (a) the anthropologist, or does it also include (b) the Western society 
which has sent him out? Most people will probably think (b), but does it also include 
(c) the different cultures studied by the anthropologist? Are they also supposed to 
learn from the anthropologist to behave in a more tolerant way towards each other? 
If that is the case, then (3) constitutes an explicit anthropological order of mission 
aimed  at  other  cultures  and  may  easily  conflict  with  cultural  relativism  as  a 
methodological principle (4). 
It is important to note that (3), as a rule, says nothing about individuals – it 
does not constitute a demand for cultures to be tolerant towards their members. It is 
thus  a  conception  of  tolerance  which  is  very  far  from  the  notion  of  tolerance 
stemming from the Enlightenment and codified in human rights where a decisive 
element is to constrain the powers of the state from suppressing its own citizens and 
thus  force  the  state  to  a  basic  tolerance  of  different  types  of  behavior  from  its 
citizens. Such a thing is by no means implied by (3), which rather points in the 
direction  of  something  like  the  Ottoman  “millet”  system  with  its  permission  of 
certain organized religious groups, but with no liberty for individuals. Very often, a 
self-critical elaboration of (3) can be found, claiming – supported by the cultural 
relativist fact (1) – that one ought to realize that one’s own values are culturally 
specific  and  hence  give  up  (naive)  ideas  of  universality  which  one  might  have 
entertained because of knowing only one culture:  
 
15)  You should see your own norms and ideas as specific for your culture. 
 
Again,  this  self-critical  maneuver  is  most  often  recommended  by  the 
anthropologist to the (Western) reader who is supposed to undertake the self-critical 
task on behalf of the west (e.g. Margaret Mead praised educated men and women 
and their habit of saying “In our culture ...”), but is (15) also valid for the cultures 
———— 
9 Herskovits (1958) actually admits this in his – surprisingly weak – apology for relativism when he concludes that 
”... there is no living in terms of unilateral tolerance, and when there is the appeal to power, one cannot but translate 
enculturated belief into action” (1958: 272). Tolerance must hence hold for all parties, and if not strife is inevitable. Jens-Martin Eriksen, Frederik Stjernfelt: Culturalism...  375 
studied  by  the  anthropologist?  Should  they  also  learn  to  see  their  own  ideas  as 
contingent,  culture-dependent  and  one-possibility-among-many?  In  that  case  it  is 
hard  to  deny  that  such  a  lecture  could  add  to  the  dissolution  of  the  culture  in 
question which will now lose its self-evident character as a matter of course when 
the  individuals realize the possibility  of substituting  other patterns of  culture for 
their own. If the other cultures are exempt from this self-critical task, on the other 
hand,  is  it  not some  sort  of racism  in  which they are  deemed  less capable than 
western self-criticizers? If all cultures are presumed to adhere to (15), and “we” are 
supposed to teach “them”, then it easily comes to contradict (3). In any case, (15) 
often contributes to a radicalization of (3) with which it is often confused: 
 
16)  Each culture has its own dignity which requires respect. 
 
It  is,  in  fact,  a  far  stronger  demand  than  (3)  which  is  compatible  with  a 
laissez-faire stance that one should not harm other cultures and just let them live – or 
protect them without critically judging their behavior. (16) erects a requirement for 
recognition of cultures, because they are assumed to possess a “dignity” (Benedict) – 
without  it being  explicit  what exactly this “respect” should consist  in  or  who  is 
supposed to practice it (all members of one culture towards all members of the other, 
or political, religious, or scientific representatives sent out to express respect?). A 
related idea is developed further in the discussion on multiculturalism by Charles 
Taylor (1994) and his idea of “recognition” of cultures. “Respect” is, in any case, a 
far more ambiguous concept than tolerance, and it may be difficult to establish what 
a claim like (16) exactly means or what it should entail in practice. It may already be 
problematic, with (3), to tolerate a whole culture where very bloody and inhuman 
practices regularly occur, but it seems much more difficult explicitly to be required 
to “respect” such things. Does respect also entail that you should, as an outsider, 
obey certain prescriptions which the other culture considers basic? Such a question 
becomes especially acute in cases where cultures are not geographically distinct but 
to some extent live together. In such cases, “respect” might constitute a renunciation 
of parts of one’s own culture. Will it then constitute an insult to its “dignity”?  
Conclusion 
  Cultural  relativism  as  we  find  it  in  its  classic  formulation  in  American 
anthropology from the 1940’s onwards is far from a simple doctrine. It consists of a 
whole cluster of loosely connected facts, axioms, prescriptions, etc., ranging from 
the  completely  unproblematic  (1)  to  strongly  problematic  and  even  hardly 
understandable ideas such as (16). 376  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LII (2010), N° 4 
It is instructive that among the different variants of actual political culturalism 
and  multiculturalism,  we  very  often  find  large  clusters  of  assumptions  directly 
inherited from classical cultural relativism. 
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